fix(e2e): the dashboard leg reaches a hardened stack; no vacuous drop-off pass - #394
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…f check can no longer pass vacuously The workers-alive phase curled with plain -fsS: no redirect following, no self-signed trust, no way to present credentials — every path through a current stack's Caddy front (HTTP 308 -> HTTPS, self-signed cert, basic auth) returned an empty payload, the visibility check failed against a healthy stack, and the drop-off loop then broke on its first probe and reported "dropped off within 0s" — a pass that measured nothing. dash_curl now follows redirects, accepts the stack's own cert, and presents E2E_DASH_AUTH when set; a never-visible worker skips the drop-off check with the reason stated. E2E_STRATUM_PASS's docs now say to set it only to a password the stack actually enforces. Header example host generalized. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QXdRGcURkgbuoo5hUG8rmB
Same class as the header example: operator-facing usage text carries a placeholder, never a real box name. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QXdRGcURkgbuoo5hUG8rmB
…ever an error page Adversarial-review finding: dropping -f from the old form changed error semantics; a 401/5xx body could reach the hostname grep. Re-verified against the live hardened stack: the -f form still follows the redirect chain and returns an empty payload on 401. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QXdRGcURkgbuoo5hUG8rmB
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Closes #390 — both halves, plus the vacuous pass the incident report didn't name.
Dashboard leg (finding 1).
phase_dashboardcurled with plain-fsS: no redirect following, no self-signed trust, no credentials. A current stack fronts the dashboard with Caddy — HTTP 308 → HTTPS, self-signed cert, basic auth — so every probe returned empty and the leg failed against a healthy stack. Newdash_curlfollows redirects, accepts the stack's own cert, and presents the newE2E_DASH_AUTH(user:pass) knob when set;E2E_DASH_URLis documented as the stack's/api/state.The vacuous drop-off pass. When the worker was never visible, the drop-off loop broke on its first probe and reported "dropped off within 0s" — a pass that measured nothing. A never-visible worker now reports the failure and skips the drop-off check with the reason stated.
Stratum leg (finding 2).
E2E_STRATUM_PASS's docs now say to set it only to a password the stack actually enforces — on a stack with auth off, any value makes the auth phases run and honestly report a "failure" that is a harness misconfiguration.Both literal host examples in usage/error text generalized to a placeholder (same class as the sibling repo's topology policy; the guard itself landed in #393).
What was RUN:
dash_curlbehavior via a recorded-argv curl stub (redirect/cert flags present;-upresent exactly whenE2E_DASH_AUTHis set), the never-visible path (failure + skip, andassert_absenton the vacuous "dropped off within"), and the visible-then-stopped path still measuring a real drop-off. Mutation, run: restoring the pre-fix body (no skip/return) turns theassert_absentred.dash_curl's form follows 1 redirect to HTTPS through the self-signed cert and reaches the basic-auth 401; wrong creds still 401. Not validated live: the credentialed 200 path — that needs the operator's dashboard password; the credentialed flag-wiring is covered by the argv-stub asserts instead. The full opt-in leg against a live stack with real creds remains a bench-run item (rig-e2e flock), unchanged in scope.make lintclean.