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docs: record measured AWS vs Azure session revocation behaviour - #74

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aaearon merged 2 commits into
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docs/aws-revocation-findings
Aug 23, 2026
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aaearon merged 2 commits into
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docs/aws-revocation-findings

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@aaearon aaearon commented Aug 23, 2026

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Records what was measured against a live tenant on 2026-08-18.

session type revoke response exit gone? creds still valid?
AWS (n=3) REVOCATION_NOT_APPLICABLE 1 no yessts:GetCallerIdentity succeeded after the revoke
Azure role REVOCATION_IN_PROGRESS 0 yes, ~25s
Entra group REVOCATION_IN_PROGRESS 0 yes

Cause: AWS exposes no session-scoped revocation primitive. STS tokens cannot be invalidated, and the alternatives (aws:TokenIssueTime deny, removing permissions) are role-scoped and would hit every concurrent session on that role. Azure/Entra elevations are role assignments, which are individually removable. This is an AWS constraint, not a product gap.

Operational consequence: grant revoke cannot contain leaked AWS credentials.

Also confirmed: REVOCATION_NOT_APPLICABLE is absent from the live public OpenAPI spec (which still enumerates only SUCCESSFULLY_REVOKED and REVOCATION_IN_PROGRESS) and returns zero web hits — which is why ClassifyRevocationStatus must keep failing closed.

Docs only; no code change. The provider-neutral rule for user-facing text is explicitly preserved.

@aaearon
aaearon merged commit fbfddad into main Aug 23, 2026
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@aaearon
aaearon deleted the docs/aws-revocation-findings branch August 23, 2026 17:48
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