🦋 New version release

[brentrager]

This PR was opened by the Changesets release GitHub action. When you're ready to do a release, you can merge this and the packages will be published to npm automatically. If you're not ready to do a release yet, that's fine, whenever you add more changesets to main, this PR will be updated.

Releases

@smooai/smooth-operator@1.58.4

Patch Changes

• a8cb4bb: fix(server): an anonymous widget visitor who gives an email is no longer locked out of its own session

  Seen in production on smoo.ai, as a total outage of the public chat.
  create_conversation_session { agentId, userEmail } answered 200, and the very
  next send_message on the same socket answered SESSION_NOT_FOUND for a
  session that plainly existed. userEmail alone was the trigger — the same
  create without it, or with only userName or browserFingerprint, streamed
  fine.

  The widget's pre-chat form collects name + email, so the email lands on the
  visitor's own user participant, and may_read_conversation counts any user
  participant with a non-blank email as making the conversation owned. A
  public widget visitor has no verified principal, which on a multi-user
  deployment is UserScope::Denied, whose arm was !owned. So the visitor was
  owner-checked against an identity it does not have, and denied the session it
  had itself created one frame earlier. The widget's recovery path then created a
  fresh session carrying the same email and was denied identically — so real
  visitors saw an unbounded retry loop and "We couldn't reach the chat", not a
  transient blip. This is th-909995 recurring for the emailful case, against
  server::anonymous_scope's own assertion that "it can still create a fresh
  session, so the anonymous widget flow keeps working": it could create, but not
  use.

  An anonymous connection can never satisfy an ownership check, so it no longer
  faces one — narrowly:

  • The exception applies only to a read reached by id (new Reach::ById),
    where the unguessable session/conversation id is the visitor's entire
    capability, exactly as it was before scoping shipped.
  • list_conversations (Reach::Listing) stays strict for everyone. Anonymous
    listing falls back to the SEED org, which is precisely where widget
    conversations pool, so granting the exception there would have leaked
    visitors' chats to each other. A negative control caught that before it
    shipped.
  • Keyed on "no verified principal" (auth_org.is_none(), set only by the
    tokenless and degraded-token branches of resolve_ws_access), not on the
    scope — an authenticated principal whose token carries no email claim still
    fails closed.
  • The tenant boundary is untouched, and the fused SESSION_NOT_FOUND from the
    storage-blip work still leaks nothing: "not found" and "not yours" remain
    byte-identical.

  Fixed at the single may_read_conversation chokepoint, so send_message,
  get_session, get_conversation_messages, confirm_tool_action,
  submit_interaction, verify_otp and conversation resume all change together.

  rust/smooth-operator-server/tests/user_scoping.rs gains the create-with-
  userEmail-then-send round trip, which is what every existing test missed: they
  exercised capture and ownership separately and never the round trip a real
  visitor makes. It asserts the session row exists after the create (the failure
  was always an authorization denial, never a failed create), then that the send
  reaches the turn. Four negative controls ride with it: SESSION_NOT_FOUND is
  still producible for that same caller on an unknown id, an authenticated
  emailless principal still cannot reach an owned session, another authenticated
  user still cannot reach the visitor's session or see it in a list, and an
  anonymous connection still cannot enumerate authenticated users' conversations.

  No API change.

@smooai/smooth-operator-web-chat-example@0.0.117

Patch Changes

• Updated dependencies [a8cb4bb]
  • @smooai/smooth-operator@1.58.4