Pin GitHub Actions to commit SHAs in PyPI publish workflow - #48
Open
elhoim wants to merge 1 commit into
Open
Conversation
The build/publish workflow referenced actions/checkout@v4, actions/setup-python@v5, actions/upload-artifact@v4, actions/download-artifact@v4 and pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@release/v1 by mutable tag/branch names. The publish job carries id-token: write for PyPI trusted publishing, so a repointed tag or compromised release branch could run untrusted code with publish rights. Pin every action to its current full commit SHA (with the corresponding version as a trailing comment) to eliminate that supply-chain surface.
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Finding 25 (Medium) —
.github/workflows/pypi-publish.yml:17,20,31,48,110Problem
actions/checkout@v4, setup-python@v5, upload-artifact@v4, download-artifact@v4 and pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@release/v1 are pinned to MUTABLE tags on a job carrying id-token: write for PyPI trusted publishing. A repointed tag would run untrusted code with publish rights.
Fix
The PyPI publish workflow (.github/workflows/pypi-publish.yml) referenced actions/checkout@v4, actions/setup-python@v5, actions/upload-artifact@v4, actions/download-artifact@v4, and pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@release/v1 by mutable tag/branch refs, while the publish job carries id-token: write for PyPI trusted publishing — a repointed tag or compromised release branch could have executed untrusted code with publish rights. Fixed by pinning each action to its current full 40-character commit SHA (resolved live via git ls-remote against the upstream actions/pypa repos), with the corresponding semantic version kept as a trailing comment for readability/maintainability.
Verification
Reproduced against the unmodified code at
9b8c605, then re-checked after the change.Before
After
python bin/cli.py --helpexits 0 and the module still imports cleanly. Verification was performed offline against the pure functions — no runningmisp-modulesinstance is required.Branched from
9b8c605. This PR addresses only this finding; the other findings from the same review are in separate PRs, so they will need rebasing against each other as they merge.🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_01DYX4TKA5inzByJ4qGWKjqh