[bot] Fast-forward for 25.7.21 - #1190
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#### Rationale EHR_BillingManager.deleteBillingRuns() filtered the invoice, invoicedItems, and miscCharges tables by objectid/invoiceId alone, with no container clause. Since DeleteBillingPeriodAction only checks EHR_BillingAdminPermission in the current container, a billing admin in one container could delete invoices and invoiced items, or detach misc charges, in any other container by submitting foreign objectids. All filters are now container-scoped via SimpleFilter.createContainerFilter(). #### Related Pull Requests * None #### Changes * EHR_BillingManager: all delete/preview filters in deleteBillingRuns() are now container-scoped via a new createContainerScopedInFilter() helper. * EHR_BillingManager.TestCase: new integration test that seeds a complete billing run in each of two folders and verifies cross-container ids are ignored by both the testOnly preview and the actual delete, while same-container deletion still removes the run and detaches its misc charges. * EHR_BillingModule: registers the test via getIntegrationTests().
…ner authz (#1152) #### Rationale Two related EHR security items surfaced during a security review. (1) EHRDemographicsService serves animal records built under the elevated EHR service user (EHRService.getEHRUser), so callers receive aggregated demographic/derived fields regardless of their per-dataset / QCState row permissions — and many DemographicsProviders set _supportsQCState=false, applying no QCState filter at all. This is intended behavior (within an EHR study folder, Read access is the trust boundary for the demographics summary, which backs the shared EHR.DemographicsCache UIs), so it is now documented in code to prevent a future caller from re-exposing these records at a lower trust boundary. (2) SetGeneticCalculationTaskSettingsAction enforced AdminPermission only on the request container while resolving and acting on a caller-supplied containerPath for the server-global genetic-calculation schedule, so a user who administers the request container could point the schedule at a container they do not administer. That gap is closed and covered by an integration test. #### Related Pull Requests * None #### Changes * Document elevated-access-by-design on EHRDemographicsServiceImpl.getAnimals and EHRController.GetDemographicsAction, warning callers not to forward these records to a lower trust boundary without re-securing them against the consuming user. * Re-verify AdminPermission on the resolved target container in SetGeneticCalculationTaskSettingsAction and throw UnauthorizedException when the caller does not administer it. * Add EHRController.TestCase, an integration test verifying that a user who administers the request container but not the resolved target is rejected while a user who administers the target succeeds; registered in EHRModule.getIntegrationTests().
## Rationale BillingNotification.createChargeSummaryReport built its per-financial-analyst tables by concatenating editor-entered database values (investigator, project, debitedAccount, projectNumber, category) and their derived URLs directly into HTML with no escaping. That HTML is rendered verbatim into the LDK RunNotificationAction admin preview via HtmlString.unsafe and is also sent as the HTML email body, so a stored payload in any of those project/alias fields executed in the browser of any user who previewed the notification or received the email — a stored XSS with privilege-escalation potential toward admins. The adjacent Charge Summary category table already escaped its values with PageFlowUtil.filter; this loop was simply never given the same treatment. ## Related Pull Requests None. ## Changes - Wrap every editor-entered value (investigator, project, account, project number, category) in PageFlowUtil.filter before rendering it into the charge summary tables. - Filter the derived href URLs (project, account, and per-field-descriptor links), which embed those same tainted values.
labkey-tchad
approved these changes
Aug 25, 2026
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