diff --git a/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/07/GHSA-q3g2-m552-3r9c/GHSA-q3g2-m552-3r9c.json b/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/07/GHSA-q3g2-m552-3r9c/GHSA-q3g2-m552-3r9c.json
index 3b0851e64497..41a094b1a151 100644
--- a/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/07/GHSA-q3g2-m552-3r9c/GHSA-q3g2-m552-3r9c.json
+++ b/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/07/GHSA-q3g2-m552-3r9c/GHSA-q3g2-m552-3r9c.json
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "schema_version": "1.4.0",
   "id": "GHSA-q3g2-m552-3r9c",
-  "modified": "2026-07-24T21:52:10Z",
+  "modified": "2026-07-24T21:52:11Z",
   "published": "2026-07-24T21:52:10Z",
   "aliases": [
     "CVE-2026-64785"
@@ -9,10 +9,6 @@
   "summary": "swift-nio-http2: Missing CR/LF/NUL validation in header values",
   "details": "## Summary\n\nSwiftNIO HTTP/2 was missing validation on inbound HEADERS frames that let\nCR, LF, NUL, SP and other control characters reach an HTTP/1.1 backend\nthrough NIOHTTP2's HTTP/2-to-HTTP/1 codec, enabling HTTP request smuggling\nor response splitting.\n\n## Impact\n\nTwo related gaps in inbound header validation, against any application\nusing HTTP2ToHTTP1Codec (or HTTP2FramePayloadToHTTP1Codec) to front an\nHTTP/1.1 backend:\n\nRegular header field values were only checked against a forbidden-name\nlist (connection, transfer-encoding, proxy-connection, keep-alive,\nupgrade); the value itself was never inspected. An attacker-controlled\nregular header field value containing CR or LF passed validation and, once\nserialized as `name: value CRLF` by the codec, terminated the field early\nand injected extra header lines into the outbound HTTP/1.1 message.\n\nPseudo-header values (`:path` in particular) were only checked against\nCR, LF and NUL. A `:path` value containing SP serializes into the\nrequest-target of `METHOD SP request-target SP HTTP-version CRLF`, so a\nvalue like `/a HTTP/1.1` produces `GET /a HTTP/1.1 HTTP/1.1` — a\nparser-differential request line depending on whether a downstream reader\ntakes the first or last SP-delimited token as the version.\n\nNeither of these is reachable on a stock pipeline: NIOHTTP1's outbound\nvalidator (`enableOutboundHeaderValidation`, on by default) already rejects\nthese characters on write. The exposure is pipelines that skip outbound\nvalidation, or any code that reads validated-looking `HTTPRequestHead.headers`\nand forwards the values on trusting that HTTP/2 already checked them.\n\n## Fix\n\nFixed in 48bfd90 and 45bdf67.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nUpgrade to 1.45.0",
   "severity": [
-    {
-      "type": "CVSS_V3",
-      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N"
-    },
     {
       "type": "CVSS_V4",
       "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
@@ -22,7 +18,7 @@
     {
       "package": {
         "ecosystem": "SwiftURL",
-        "name": "swift-nio-http2"
+        "name": "github.com/apple/swift-nio-http2"
       },
       "ranges": [
         {