diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 5cfa7167..599570bb 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -46,6 +46,17 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
   externalized today, so a stricter policy would need that rewritten first.
   Defense-in-depth: this would have limited the blast radius of the retune
   XSS above (and any future/residual one) even before that fix landed.
+- **CSP now allows `blob:` workers, fixing a blank Tab View / Staff View
+  render.** The baseline CSP added above (#47) covered
+  `script-src`/`style-src`/`img-src`/`font-src`/`media-src`/`connect-src`
+  but never set `worker-src`. Per CSP fallback rules, a worker without an
+  explicit `worker-src` falls back to `script-src`'s policy, which allows
+  `'self'`/`'unsafe-inline'`/`https:` but not `blob:` — and alphaTab (used
+  by the `tabview` and `staffview` plugins) spawns its rendering worker
+  from a `blob:` URL. Without `worker-src`, browsers silently blocked that
+  worker, rendering a blank canvas for every song. Added
+  `worker-src 'self' blob:;`, matching the `blob:` allowance already
+  granted to `img-src`/`media-src` for the same plugin-CDN-asset reason.
 
 ### Fixed
 
diff --git a/server.py b/server.py
index a3ded5ce..7c996bdd 100644
--- a/server.py
+++ b/server.py
@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@
         "img-src 'self' data: blob: https:; "
         "font-src 'self' data: https:; "
         "media-src 'self' blob: https:; "
+        "worker-src 'self' blob:; "
         "connect-src 'self' https: wss: ws:; "
         "object-src 'none'; "
         "base-uri 'self'; "
diff --git a/tests/test_security_headers.py b/tests/test_security_headers.py
index e75f7016..f517c94d 100644
--- a/tests/test_security_headers.py
+++ b/tests/test_security_headers.py
@@ -61,6 +61,21 @@ def test_csp_blocks_non_https_script_origins_but_allows_self_and_https(client):
     assert "*" not in script_src
 
 
+def test_csp_allows_self_and_blob_workers(client):
+    # alphaTab (tabview/staffview) spawns its rendering worker from a blob:
+    # URL. Without an explicit worker-src, CSP falls back to script-src,
+    # which allows 'self'/https: but not blob: -- silently blocking the
+    # worker and rendering a blank canvas (issue: worker-src missing after
+    # the #44/#47 baseline-CSP addition).
+    r = client.get("/api/version")
+    csp = r.headers["Content-Security-Policy"]
+    worker_src = next(part for part in csp.split(";") if part.strip().startswith("worker-src"))
+    assert "'self'" in worker_src
+    assert "blob:" in worker_src
+    assert "http:" not in worker_src
+    assert "data:" not in worker_src
+
+
 def test_security_headers_present_on_error_responses_too(client):
     # A 404 (unknown route) must still carry the headers — they're set via
     # middleware wrapping the whole call_next chain, not per-route.